expanding the use of the Greenlandic language, extending support to the Greenlandic cultural life, replacing Danish workers with Greenlanders etc. (Dahl, 1986: 129-149). The policy formulations since the establishment of the Home Rule have been, to a great extent, characterized as *"Greenlandizing"*.

My analysis has shed light upon how the historical processes of Danish colonialism, neo-colonialism, and core-peripheral relations are crucial to gain an understanding of present-day relations between Denmark and Greenland. It is not possible to view Greenland's current state of affairs as the persistence of an "original state". Greenland's current dependency on Danish block grants and Danish know-how should be understood in the light of these historical processes. Samir Amin has used the term of "blocked development" about this kind of situation where many years of colonialism and neo-colonialism has caused dependency and underdevelopment. He argues that in these situations fundamental structural changes are needed in order to obtain independence (qt. in Dahl, 1986: 24). In this light, I argue that awareness about the colonial history of Denmark and Greenland is crucial for the redefinition of Greenland-Denmark relations, as well as for the practice of Greenlandic self-governance.

Perspectives on National Identity in Greenland

"Who is the most Greenlandic?"

The question of "Greenlandicness" has been debated in Greenland throughout the last centuries, and still is. I argue that the concern with national identity in Greenland occurs for various reasons that have to do with the historical and colonial processes by which the Inuit populations of Greenland have been incorporated into the present global grid of sovereign nation-states, the dependency on Danish labour skills and block grants from the Danish state, increased integration in a globalizing world, and the continuous challenges to self-determination. Today, the question of "the definition of a Greenlander" is often accentuated and debated in Greenlandic newspapers and public forums. Last summer, a group of students from Nuuk, who were involved in a theatre comedy, satirically titled their performance: *Who is the most Greenlandic?* They 'humourized' the popular images

and understandings of 'the Greenlander' as solely the kayak hunter or the fisherman. The national identity debate also seems to be particularly significant to the young generations who have grown up in modern Greenlandic society and engage different interpretations of "Greenlandicness" than their parents.

Furthermore, I argue that the national identity debate is particularly important to the specific political moment in which Greenland will begin to practice increased self-governance. During the public hearing on the Self-Government proposal by the Greenlandic-Danish Self-Government Commission in Nuuk on the 18 June 2008, I noticed that the public was not only concerned with the legal, institutional, and economic dimensions of self-governance: a few questions to the commission by the public also referred to how the definitions of Greenlandic identity tie into the practice of increased self-determination.

With the implementation of Self-Government, Greenlanders will be recognized as a people according to international law. The preamble of the bill on Self-Government states: "In recognition of the Greenlandic people as a people with the right to self-determination in accordance with international law, this law is based on the wish to advance equality and mutual respect in the partnership between Denmark and Greenland" (own translation, Rasmussen, 2009). Following this statement a new question surfaces: *who* constitutes the "Greenlandic people"? As Ole Spierman (Professor at the University of Copenhagen) stated at a public lecture at Ilisimatusarfik (the University of Greenland), it will be up to the population of Greenland to define the meaning of *"the Greenlandic people"* (for example, in relation to future considerations of Greenlandic citizenship). This process of defining "the people" inevitably entails a discussion of the interpretations of "Greenlandicness". I thus argue that the present study of the ways in which national identity is conceptualized is useful and necessary to the processes of negotiating greater self-determination.

In this chapter, I will discuss the ways in which national identity is conceptualized in Greenland. First, I will contextualize the concept of Greenlandic national identity in a historical and theoretical framework. My theoretical framework is mainly informed by Anthony D. Smith and Michael Billig, who have written extensively on social identity formation in relation to nationalism and national identity. In the

following sections, I will discuss various conceptualizations of Greenlandic national identity as they relate to territory, upbringing, language, Inuicity (Inuit identity), traditions, and values. In this chapter, I will draw on Greenlandic and Danish scholarly work, as well as my own research and interviews during my studies in Greenland, summer 2008.

The Concept of Greenlandic National Identity in a Historical and Theoretical Framework

In order to gain an understanding of the concepts of national identity in Greenland, it is useful to contextualize it with concepts of the nation-state and nationalism. Arguably, Greenlandic national identity as a concept has emerged along with the historical processes in which a global system of nation-states has been founded. As Walter C. Opello and Stephen J. Rosow (2004) have shown, the idea of the state has been transmitted by imperialist European states to non-European parts of the world. In this way, the Inuit peoples of Greenland acquired the state as an institutional artifact of colonialism, as I have also discussed in my previous chapter. Opello and Rosow argue that nationalism “re-formed the state as it had appeared in Europe and transformed the world of colonial empires into the present global grid of sovereign nation-states” (Opello & Rosow, 2004: 191). They argue that the concept of the nation is not natural or primordial but a more or less conscious creation which has been closely connected to the needs of the territorial state. The state has therefore been “nationalized” through the creation of a sense of nationhood and a common national identity, enabling states to increase their politico-military power (Opello & Rosow 192-193).

In Greenland, the concept of a Greenlandic nation was transferred to the local populations by Denmark; it emerged through the specific colonial administration by which the decentralized populations gained a sense of unity (see chapter 1). During the wave of anti-colonial nationalist movements of the 1960s and 1970s, the argument that Greenlanders were a distinct people with the right to self-determination was instrumental in political mobilization. Thus, the view that Greenlanders constituted a nation with a distinct national identity gained foothold. Through these historical processes, and in particular with the establishment of Home Rule, the Greenlandic community has come to

share the characteristics of what defines a nation. According to Anthony D. Smith, a nation is "a named human community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members. […I]t is not necessary for a nation[…] to possess a sovereign state of its own, but only to have an aspiration for a measure of autonomy coupled with the physical occupation of its homeland." (Smith, 2001: 13-14). For these reasons, it is possible to conceptualize the Greenlandic community as a nation where the concept and discourse of national identity carry specific importance.

There have been numerous studies of collective identity. According to scholars such as Fredrik Barth (1969), Bennedict Anderson (1996), and Eric J. Hobsbawm (1990), the concept of identity is primarily defined as a social construction. In this view, identity concerns the ways in which people relate to another group and other persons. Importantly, these views reject the perennialist idea that nationhood, or national identity, is a type of *universal, disembedded* and *recurrent* collective identity (Smith, 2001: 49-51). These studies have led to the recognition that collective identity and personal identity are socially constructed and manifested in dynamic processes (Dorais qt. in Bjørst, 2008: 33). Oosten and Remie have argued that concepts of cultural and ethnic identities of Inuit peoples are used and manipulated to pursue specific interests within a wider political arena such as hunting rights and political autonomy (Oosten & Remie, 1999: 3). Furthermore, Dorais argues that the employment of a national narrative is particularly important to ethnic communities pursuing self-determination over a defined territory (Dorais qt. in Bjørst, 2008: 34). In the specific context of Greenland, concepts of national identity have been utilized with the struggle for self-determination and the right to independence.

Smith suggests that a working definition of national identity can be conceptualized as "the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of the patterns of values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations, and the identifications of individuals with that pattern and heritage and with its cultural elements" (Smith, 2001: 18). Specific attention should be given to the relationships between the collective and individual levels of analysis, and between continuity and change (Smith, 2001: 18). Furthermore, Michael Billig has argued that the

concept of national identity is problematic in itself as it often suggests that it is a sort of primordial inheritance. 'Identity' as a 'watchword of the times' has often come to mean something abstract, which exists apart from forms of life (Billig, 1995: 60-65). As Billig argues, "an investigation of national identity should aim to disperse the concept of 'identity' into different elements. And 'identity' is not a thing; it is a short-hand description of the ways of talking about the self and community. Ways of talking, or ideological discourses, do not develop in social vacuums, but they are related to forms of life. In this respect, 'identity' if it is to be understood as a form of talking, is also understood as a form of life" (Billig, 1995: 60). On this basis, I seek to investigate how 'forms of life' constitute Greenlandic national identity. My study of the conceptualization of "Greenlandicness" therefore refers to the ways in which criteria of language, ethnicity, territory, indigeneity, tradition, and values are perceived to constitute 'Greenlandic forms of life'.

Kalaallit Nunaat: The Land of Greenlanders

Attachment to the land is one dimension of national identity that is often mentioned as an important characteristic of "Greenlandicness" in popular discourses. The idea of being attached to the land has undergone processes of transformation by which locality has been complemented with nationality. In recent years, the idea of "attachment to the land" is increasingly understood as something related to place of birth, upbringing, living with the Greenlandic nature, and solidarity with the country – and it is not necessarily conceptualized as a principle of descent.

Prior to colonization, the peoples of the Arctic were primarily identified with the place or region to which they belonged by adding '-mioq'. For example, a person from Arsuk was called 'Arsumioq'. Arsuk means "the little beloved place". Thus, an 'Arsumioq' means a 'person of the little beloved place'. East Greenlanders were called 'Tunumiut' ('the inhabitants of the backside') by West Greenlanders. In the beginning of the Danish/Norwegian mission in the eighteenth century, the population of the West coast of Greenland referred to themselves as Inuit (human beings) and "Kalaallit" (Greenlanders). Originally, "Kalaallit" was used by the Old Norse peoples to denote the Inuit (Bjørst, 2008: 121). It was not until the end of the nineteenth century that

“Kalaallit” was used as a common basis of identification. In 1861, the Greenlandic newspaper Atuagagdliutit (AG) began to use the term as a name for all local populations of Greenland (Thomsen, 1998: 27-28). In this way, the geographical area of what is today Greenland was named Kalaallit Nunaat: the Land of Greenlanders.

Greenland has always been, and still is in many ways, a decentralized society. However, with the processes of increased centralization and urbanization throughout the last century, the identification with a local geographical area has been complemented by a national identity attached to the Land of Greenlanders, Kalaallit Nunaat. It is my impression that the aspect of feeling attached to the land, and living in and with Greenlandic nature is today perceived as an essential aspect of “Greenlandicness”. This arguably stems from the many centuries in which Indigenous Greenlanders have lived in close relation with the natural environment. Despite the ways in which these values are connected with Indigenous identities, I argue that in recent years the idea of attachment to the land as a national characteristic is also being re-interpreted as something that is acquired through place of birth, upbringing, and solidarity with the land. A Native Greenlander told me that, today, she thinks that a Greenlander is a person who lives in Greenland. She did not always think like that but today she does. Søren Søndergaard Hansen, who moved to Greenland from Denmark in 1983 and is the judge in Greenland’s Court (Grønlands Landsret) stated that every individual can decide whether they are a Greenlander or a Dane, because it is not a juridical question yet. He said: “You can be Greenlandic at heart, if you are born here and have grown up here and feel solidarity with the country” (own translation, S. Søndergaard, personal communication, June, 2008).

However, the concept of national identity is more than either a juridical question or a matter of self-identification. As previously mentioned, the concept of “Greenlandicness” is constituted by different elements of what is perceived to be “forms of life”. The emphasis on place of birth and residence, upbringing, attachment to the land, and self-identification in recent discourses arguably reflects new movements towards renegotiating and redefining national identities in Greenland in more inclusive terms. However, there are other elements of “forms of life” which constitute the interpretation of “Greenlandicness”. They complicate, and in some cases fixate, everyday conceptualizations of Greenlandic national identity. Some of these elements will be

discussed below.

The Kalaallit as the Inuk and the Dane as the Qallunaat

Today, Greenlandic national identity is often voiced as more of a cultural, political, territorial, and linguistic concern rather than a distinctively ethnic one (see Nutall, 1992). This may be an accurate observation as Greenlandic identity is undergoing challenging re-definitions due to a growing diversity in the larger towns, particularly in Nuuk. Nonetheless, I argue that ethnicity often takes a determining role in the conceptualization of "Greenlandicness". The concept of ethnicity is complex, and it also involves considerations of culture, language, and myths; ethnic identities are socially constructed and their formulations are un-fixed, dynamic, and changeable. However, in everyday life, ethnic identities in Greenland are largely perceived to be fixed and unchangeable, which is manifested in the distinction between Danes and Greenlanders. In other words, the concept of the Greenlandic nation takes on an ethnic feature, conditioned by the constant demarcation between Greenlanders and Danes. During my field research in Greenland, I observed that this often leads to a perceived impossibility in *becoming* Greenlandic. Søren Porsbøl said in an interview I conducted in May 2008 in Nuuk:

> I will never become a Greenlander. It is not possible to become a Greenlander, when you are not born here and have not grown up here – and when it [Greenlandic] is not your mother tongue. […] I do not feel that I would be accepted as a Greenlander. I am accepted as a human being and as a colleague, but I will probably never be considered a Greenlander.
>
> (own translation, S. Porsbøl, personal communication, May 2008)

At the time I conducted the interview, Søren Porsbøl worked as the Deputy Head of Inerisaavik which is Greenland's Institute for Educational Pedagogy (Institut for Uddannelsesvidenskab). Porsbøl is from Denmark but moved to Greenland in 1973. He informed me that he is married to a Greenlander with whom he has a daughter. During the interview, he expressed that he feels well integrated in Nuuk where he has a large network of friends.

Porsbøl's statement reflects the process of ethnic identity formation in Greenland, which is conditioned by the distinction between migrant Danes and Indigenous Greenlanders. According to Porsbøl, an upbringing in Greenland and speaking Greenlandic as mother tongue are essential 'requirements' in order to be considered a Greenlander. However, there are very few Danes who have grown up in Greenland and speak Greenlandic either as mother tongue or second language. Porsbøl's 'requirements' are thus fulfilled predominantly by Indigenous Greenlanders. Taking into consideration these unspoken dimensions of his statement, Porsbøl implies a synonymy between being Greenlandic and being Indigenous. In effect, there is a perceived impossibility in *becoming* Greenlandic.

A number of scholars writing on Greenland have argued that through the colonial history of ethnic stratification a dichotomy of 'the Kalaallit' (the Greenlander) and 'the Dane' is constructed (see Bjørst, 2008; Kleivan, 1969; Lynge, 2008; Oosten & Remie, 1999). Kleivan, who has written on the formulations of a Greenlandic ethnic identity in 1969, employs a Barthian approach to explain how the boundaries between two groups condition and define their ethnic identities (Barth 1969; Kleivan 1969). Kleivan argues that the decreasing cultural distance between Danes and Greenlanders in the aftermath of the formal political integration of 1953 did not imply that Greenlanders would assimilate into the Danish ethnic group and adopt its identity – as was often presupposed (Kleivan, 1969: 109-110). He writes that "[t]he traditional content of the Greenlandic identity, admittedly, is not being maintained through the overwhelming changes in culture and total circumstances; but the dichotomy of Greenlander and Dane is maintained and new diacriteria are emerging for the Greenlandic ethnic identity" (Kleivan, 1969: 210). Kleivan refers to the feeling of *"white dominance"* and Greenlandic inferiority which persisted after the formal abolition of Greenland's status as a colony. He states that as Greenland was integrated into Denmark in 1953, Greenlanders were per definition equal citizens with Danes. However, there was a discrepancy between the legal charter (which defined the relations between the two ethnic groups as based on equality) and reality by which Greenlanders still experienced social and economic inferiority (Kleivan, 1969: 217). In effect, Kleivan writes, "[…t]here is no doubt that this has contributed greatly to strengthen consciousness and cohesion in the Greenlandic

ethnic group […and] served to dichotomise two ethnic groups" (Kleivan, 1969: 218-219).

Kleivan's arguments resonate with the current situation in Greenland. In order to understand the relation between the minority of Danes and the majority of Indigenous Greenlanders, it is crucial to bear in mind the dominant position of Danes in the Greenlandic labour market. Danes generally occupy the higher positions in the public sphere in which the language in use is primarily Danish. However, Danes do not dominate the political arena, as internal politics has been steered by Greenlandic politicians since the establishment of Home Rule in 1979 (Trondheim, 2002, 200-202). Due to the fact that Danes often occupy elite positions in Greenland, Trondheim has argued that Danes constitute a "minority-majority" – a minority-majority which the majority of the population has to adapt to (Trondheim, 2002, 190-191). For such reasons, Greenlanders and Danes may live more alike than ever before, but Greenlandic attempts to demarcate the differences are stronger (Bjørst, 2008 16-18).

Furthermore, the dichotomy between the Dane and the Greenlander has taken on specific characteristics that imply a synonymy between "Greenlandic" and "Indigenous". In many ways, the ethnic feature in the concept of the Greenlandic nation is rooted in the politicization of Inuit identity during the struggle for greater self-determination. As Dorais argues, Inuicity (Inuit identity) in Greenland was previously manifested in language and customs but as an effect of acculturation and the establishment of Home Rule, Inuicity is today rather manifested in the distinction between two nations, two entities: Denmark and Greenland (Dorais, 1996: 28-29). Dorais' arguments imply that in the specific case of Greenland, identity as Inuit is primarily embodied in the dichotomy of the Kalallit and the Dane. Therefore it is possible to suggest that Inuicity has been nationalized, and the distinction between Greenlanders and Danes has also become a distinction between Inuit and "Qallunaat". "Qallunaat" has been used by Arctic peoples to refer to Europeans, since the first encounters. "Qallunaat" is still used in both Inuktitut and Greenlandic and can be translated as *"white people"* (Oosten & Remie, 1999: 5-6). In Greenland, "Qallunaat" has come to mean "Dane". Thus, being "Kalallit" is perceived as synonymous with being Inuk by which the Dane has become "Qallunaat". This has, arguably, led to the perceived "impossibility" of *becoming* a Greenlander.

Nonetheless, it is crucial to recognize that there are also many challenges to rigid perceptions of what is meant by "Greenlandic". During my field research, I observed that there are current attempts to recognize and emphasize how ethnic boundaries are increasingly becoming blurred and unfixed, specifically due to the many inter-personal, inter-ethnic relations within Greenland. The visual artist Julie Edel Hardenberg has recently published a book with a series of photos which challenge the notions of heterogeneity in Greenland titled "The Quiet Diversity" (Hardenberg, 2005). I will argue that "the quiet diversity" and the subsequent pressures for recognizing "the quiet diversity" enable re-interpretations and re-negotiations of dichotomous perceptions of national identities.

The Role of Language

Greenlandic and Danish are currently the two official languages in Greenland, but Greenlandic is positioned as the "principal language". However, Greenland is required to assure that it is still possible to use Danish in work places and institutions. According to the Self-Government report, Greenlandic will become the official language after the implementation of Self-Government in June 2009 (Grønlandsk-dansk Selvstyre-kommission, 2008: 12). Today, Greenlandic is widely spoken and used – and seems in no way endangered. However, expanding and strengthening the use of Greenlandic is still a central political and public concern due to the strong presence of Danish, particularly, in higher educational institutions and in the bureaucratic administration. The Greenlandic language therefore occupies a very strong position in debates on Greenlandic identity. Nonetheless, the role of language is rather complicated, as the use of Greenlandic and Danish cross over in different contexts and situations. Some younger Greenlanders, especially those of mixed origins, do not master Greenlandic. Some are fully bilingual. As Petersen states, the majority speaks fluent Greenlandic but little Danish (Petersen, 1995: 293).

The use of language takes on specific characteristics which are important to the definitions of national identity. On the one hand, it seems that *speaking* Greenlandic is aligned with *being* Greenlandic. Speaking Greenlandic allows one to be included in the social life of Greenlanders. On the other hand, Danish is often given a higher social status

and is considered necessary for a ‘successful life’ – even though mastering Danish, and not Greenlandic, often excludes one from being considered part of the nation (Trondheim, 2002). I will argue that in the same vein as Trondheim argues that Danes constitute a “minority-majority” (a minority-majority which the majority of the population has to adapt to), the Danish language also constitutes a “minority-majority” language. There are no requirements of Danes to acquire Greenlandic language skills – and there may also be little motivation to learn the language on behalf of many Danes. In effect, the majority is expected to be able to speak the minority’s language: an expectation which comes from outside and from within. Speaking Danish is also related with a “higher status”; it gives better education opportunities in Denmark, it is widely used in the public administration due to the presence of Danish workers etc. It seems that speaking Danish is not only perceived as a necessity, but also the only way to ‘get somewhere’.

This is arguably a reflection of the effects of the 1950s school policies by which school classes were divided; in each school there was an A class (where the lessons were taught in Greenlandic) and a B class (where all lessons were taught in Danish, except from lessons in Greenlandic and Christianity). In some recorded comments from school principals, it is evident that they viewed the students in the A class as being less intelligent (qt. in Nielsen, 1999: 281). The A class later became known as “the Black School”. Meanwhile, the educational level may very well have been higher in the B classes due to access to better educated (and better paid) Danish teachers etc. Many parents therefore preferred to send their children in a Danish speaking class due to the higher educational levels (Nielsen, 1999: 280-281). I argue that this caused a divide between those who mastered Danish and those who did not. After the establishment of Home Rule and the focus on Greenlandic identity in the 1970s, language became a target for the *Greenlandization* reforms. The Home government assumed responsibility for education and aimed at preserving and extending the use of Greenlandic in educational, institutional, and administrative settings (Tobiassen, 1995: 35 & 61). However, as I have been explained, the divide between school classes persisted in an attempt to teach Greenlandic to the non-Greenlandic speaking students, so that they later on would integrate with the Greenlandic-speaking classes. The project failed and instead reinforced

the division. Within the last decades, new language policies have ensured that school classes are mixed. Teachers are therefore required to be able to teach all courses in both Greenlandic and Danish. Everything is (or should be) translated into both Greenlandic and Danish (e.g. newspapers, news programmes, magazines) and in official settings, there are always interpreters (Grønlandsk-dansk Selvstyre-kommission, 2008: 12).

Despite the new efforts to strengthen both the position and the use of Greenlandic, there is still a considerable number of Greenlanders who do not master the language fully. As Bjørst points out, this group experiences difficulty in being accepted as Greenlanders (Bjørst, 2008: 38). She refers to an interview by Lisbeth Valgreen who had interviewed a Danish-speaking Greenlander:

> I have gone through this identity crisis – what am I? Why are they all saying that I am a stupid Dane, and when I look at my Greenlandic family whom I have had the most contact with[…] then I am Greenlandic, and in Denmark I found out (that there) I am definitely not a Dane (own translation, qt. in Bjørst, 2008: 38)

I have heard similar stories from Greenlanders, who do not speak Greenlandic, who have experienced social exclusion because they are not considered Greenlanders – and in some ways, they do not consider themselves Greenlandic. They may also experience anger from the older generations. Meanwhile, it seems that the preference of using Danish in everyday life among the young generations is strengthening. This may be a result of the connection between speaking Danish and better future opportunities, as well as the extensive use of Danish in administrative and institutional settings. In fact, there are young Greenlanders from Greenlandic speaking families who do not speak Greenlandic fluently.

Arguably, there are different movements in the positioning of language in relation to definitions of Greenlandic national identity. On the one hand, the Greenlandic language is taking a central role in defining “Greenlandicness”; new policies to strengthen its use are being formulated and implemented. Those Greenlanders who do not speak Greenlandic fluently are experiencing difficulties in being considered part of the

nation. On the other hand, Danish is still related with a higher social status and there is a tendency of young Greenlanders to prefer speaking Danish. This is a challenge for a self-governing Greenland.

The Real Greenlanders and the New Greenlanders

During my field research in Greenland, I observed a discourse of *"loss of identity"*. This discourse reflects a concern that Greenlanders in a modern "Danized" Greenland have lost their sense of '*Greenlandicness'*. As Bjørst states, this is a central problematic in the conceptualization of Greenlandic identity. In her interviews, a young song writer, Daani Lynge, said:

> There are two types of Greenlanders today. Those who care about 'the Greenlandic' and would like to be [Greenlandic], and those who keep it as an image. There are some who keep it alive as hunters… And those who wear ties, they only keep it as an image and want to build Greenland in their way. It is not good. We are losing our souls. This is unfortunate[…]. Most people have lost their soul, me too[…]" (own translation, Bjørst, 2008: 38-39).

Even though the interviewee has lived his whole life in Greenland and is fully bilingual, he feels that he is not 'fully' Greenlandic because he has lost the 'Greenlandic soul'. The interviewee expressed that he wishes to connect to something authentic found in the time before the Inuit were mixed with other peoples. Thus, discourses about *Greenlandicness* often refer to 'old' traditions of, for example, hunting and kayaking. In effect, it may seem difficult to be both *Greenlandic* and *modern* (Bjørst, 2008). As is evident in Daani Lynge's words, this may be a considerable problematic for many young Greenlanders who have grown up in modern Greenland with an everyday life that is relatively distant from the traditional ways of life.

Thomsen has also discussed this problematic in her article *Between Traditionalism and Modernity.* She holds that the conceptualization of "Greenlandicness" in many ways contrasts today's reality. She argues that since the 1960s everything

modern has been set apart from what is perceived "Greenlandic". Thus, modern Greenland is understood as being "Danish" and not "Greenlandic". In this way, Greenlanders have to defend choosing to use a computer rather than a kayak. The "real Greenland" is often associated with the smaller settlements, Thule, and East Greenland – areas that are less modernized (Thomsen, 1996: 265). This proposition resonates with my own experiences in Greenland. When I returned to Nuuk after spending a month in smaller villages, I was asked if I had seen "Greenland" because, as was explained to me, "Nuuk is not Greenlandic".

Thomsen argues that the traditionalist discourse is a result of "culture preserving" Danish colonial policies. She assesses how the Danish colonial administration created an image of the Greenlander as a kayak hunter only because the colonial engagement was dependent on Greenland's supply of hunting products (Thomsen, 1996: 266). "Greenlandicness", as related to hunting life, has been the dominant images since the colonial period. Early writers on Greenland (e.g. Rink and Rasmussen) represented the Greenlanders as either the authentic happy hunter who became the "Good Greenlander", or the semi-civilized inauthentic and lazy wageworker who became the "Bad Greenlander". They created an image of Greenlanders as "free children of nature [and] whatever sour in the world of the Eskimo came with civilization" (Thomsen, 1996: 268). Thomsen shows that the identity debate changed with the modernization policies after the Second World War. It became possible to be a "good Greenlander" even if one was not a hunter – but it was based on an assimilation strategy in which the Greenlanders were to learn from the Danes in order to reach "the Danish stage of evolution" as quickly as possible (Thomsen, 1996: 270). During the nationalist movements of the 1960s and 1970s, young Greenlanders used the romanticized images of the good, happy, and peaceful Eskimo in the political struggle for independence. The past became the symbol of Greenland's self-sufficiency – and "Greenlandicness" became excluded from modern society (Thomsen, 1996: 270-273). As Thomsen argues, the modern world came to "belong" to the Danes. Thomsen writes: "[t]he problem is simply that they are ideologically imprisoning themselves in mythical conceptions of their past" (Thomsen, 1996: 274).

Bjørst holds that the cultural policies of the Home Rule, as part of a nation-

building project, reinforce an essentialized discourse of what the "real" Greenland looks like (Bjørst, 2008: 49-54). She refers to this statement of *Kulturredegørelsen* (Statement on Cultural Policy) from 2004:

> The objective and the content of a new cultural policy will, to a considerable extent, be based on a public consciousness of our history so that the people live with, and have awareness of, the spiritual and mental values, and strengthen both spiritually and as a people in relation to working towards self-governance. The Home Rule will prepare a plan of action for the coming years taking as a starting point the particular characteristics of the Inuit in the international context and our own identity as Greenlanders (own translation, Direktoratet for Kultur, Uddannelse, Forskning og Kirke, 2004: 5).

Bjørst argues that Greenland's cultural policies reinforce static and stereotypical ideas of what is Greenlandic and are therefore more exclusive than inclusive. Thus, such policies complicate aligning "modern" *and* "Greenlandic" (Bjørst, 2008: 50-54). This is highly problematic as individuals in Greenland, especially the younger generations, are struggling to identify as Greenlanders. Instead, a conception of "loss of identity" becomes dominant.

However, Thomsen also points out that traditionalism is under pressure by renewed discussions stressing that modern is also Greenlandic. The traditionalist conceptualization of Greenlandicness is also being redefined. As Emil Abelsen, Minister of Economic Affairs in 1991, has stated: "What is really Greenlandic is not, as the traditionalists claim, the maintenance of subsistence hunting and the settlements, but mobility and the ability to go where the subsistence potential is" (qt. in Thomsen, 1996: 266). This statement may reflect a change in perspective on Greenlandicness. At the same time, I will also argue that traditionalist conceptions of Greenlandic national identity are not only pressured by 'renewed (political) discussions' but also by younger generations who are increasingly relating to global mainstream culture (Rygaard, 2002). The younger generations travel abroad and go on exchange programmes; many study at universities in

Denmark. Video games, skateboarding, pop music, and foreign movies are becoming an integrated part of the every day lives in Greenland. However, this does not necessarily reflect a sense of "losing identity". As Rygaard suggests, "[t]he young people in Greenland eagerly grab at the temptations of the global world. This is shown in their media habits, their interests, and their desire for consumption. But at the same time, they have their feet planted in their local culture reflecting their hopes and dreams" (own translation, Rygaard, 2002: 182). In these ways, young Greenlanders are not necessarily actively or directly re-defining the conceptualization of Greenlandicness, but challenging it by "re-living" it. As a result, new visions may follow that challenge traditionalist claims about "real Greenlandicness". In the newspaper Atuagagdliut (AG), Maliina Abelsen wrote a reader's comment to the Greenlandic politician Lars-Emil Johansen:

> "The Home Rule's children are growing up. And you have done a good job, for I am from a generation of young Greenlanders who do not at all doubt that 'we can do this' as long as we remember solidarity and each other. A generation that is not sitting in the corner to discuss how the [Danish] construction workers in the 1970s got their jobs because of their ethnicity. We have responsibility that such a policy does not repeat itself […]. To make sure that you get the jobs, the titles, and the leading positions because you are the best and not because you are of a certain ethnicity, do not speak up for yourself, or belong to a certain party. In relation to our history, we have a choice. We can chose to accept the time we are living in, to learn from history and move forward[…]" (own translation, Abelsen, 2008, June 17, p. 17).

Thus, parallel to the traditionalist conceptions of Greenlandicness, it seems that there is also a pressure from the younger generations to reinterpret "what it means to be a Greenlander" in terms that are less focused on "something authentic found in the time before the Inuit were mixed with other peoples". There is a wish to learn from history but with the aspiration to "move forward", as Maliina Abelsen expresses it. In these ways, defining Greenlandic national identity is a dynamic process that constantly undergoes

redefinitions and change. Nonetheless, the emphasis on “authenticity” and “realness” has also led to fixed and static conceptions of Greenlandicness and a subsequent perception of “loss of identity” among young Greenlanders. As I will discuss in my next chapter on Eskimo Orientalism, this is not merely an internal problematic of Greenlandic society; the images of “real Greenlanders” are also kept alive in Danish representations of Greenland.

In conclusion, I argue that the various criteria of territory, upbringing, language, ethnicity, indigeneity, tradition, and values that are perceived to constitute ‘Greenlandic forms of life’ are interrelated and interchangeable. Furthermore, different aspects of Greenlandic national identity are utilized according to the situation. In today’s Greenland, it seems that there are pressures of re-interpreting the conceptualization of “Greenlandicness” in more inclusive terms than previously. As the youth organization of the Greenlandic political party IA (Inuusuttut Ataqatigiit) stated last year, they will focus on integration rather than Greenlandization with the message: “There is room for everyone” (own translation Kleeman, 2008, April 21). In this light, the conceptualization of Greenlandic national identity is a dynamic process. At the same time, conceptions of “Greenlandicness” are also often constituted in dichotomies between the Kalaallit and the Qallunaat, Indigenousness and non-Indigenousness, “real Greenlanders” and “modern Greenlanders” which fixate the discourse on national identity. Moreover, it is crucial to consider the ways in which the “minority-majority” position of Danes and the Danish language influence this discourse – and challenge Greenlandic self-governance. Nonetheless, the transition to Greenlandic Self-Government may spur new debates on ‘Greenlandic forms of life’.